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Bioterrorist attack involves the intentional release of harmful 
pathogens to spread diseases which may lead to illness or death. 
These Biological agents can sometimes be made more abusive 
by increasing their ability to cause or spread diseases. Biodefense 
involves medical measures to protect people against bioterrorist 
attacks.                    
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troop’s activities or a natural consequence of susceptibility. Biological 
warfare has occurred more recently during World War I and II and was 
supported by the biological weapons research programs of German, 
American, British, USSR and Japanese governments for military use 
[6]. Particularly notable was the Japanese Army’s notorious Unit 731, 
whose military medical doctors and specialists, under the command 
and direction of Lt. Gen. Ishii Shirō carried out diabolical experiments 
in Pingfan, Harbin, China on humans for the purpose of developing 
effective biological warfare weapons [7].
Modern examples of biological weapon and bioterrorism activity 
include: incidents in former USSR’s Biopreparat [8,9]; Iraq’s biological 
weapons program [8]; Salmonella contamination of the salad bars in 
The Dalles, Oregon, by the Rajneeshee commune for religious and 
political purposes [10]; anthrax hoaxes in the late 1990s in the United 
States [11]; bioterrorist attacks and development of botulinum toxin, 
anthrax, cholera, and Q fever for bioterrorist use in Japan by Aum 
Shinrikyo [12]; assassination of two Bulgarian traitors, Vladimir 
Kostov and Georgi Markov, by ricin ammunition in a small bullet shot 
by a modified umbrella [6]; anthrax spore letter attack in the United 
State in 2001 [13]; ricin bioterrorism attack in U.K. and several other 
documented bioterrorism hoaxes and non-succeed bioterrorist attacks [14].
The knowledge needed for developing biological weapons is 
accessible to individuals through the open literature and the Internet. 
Many bioterrorism-associated pathogens exist in host animals or vectors 
in their natural foci; bulk production of biological agents is cheap, with 
The Real Threat of Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism has long been recognized as a threat to human beings, 
animals and agriculture [1]. The world was awakened with a real case 
following September 11th 2001 in the U.S.A. with the anthrax-letter 
attacks. Bioterrorism is the deliberate use of living organisms or their 
byproducts (toxins) to inflict harm to susceptible humans, animals, plants, 
the environment or material by individuals, state-sponsored groups, 
insurgent/rebel, Doomsday/cult-type group, nonaligned terrorists, 
splinter groups, or lone offenders, in order to cause societal panic or 
menace societal safety and stability. The motives behind bioterrorism 
can be political, ideological, religious, or criminal, and sometimes only 
for personal reprisal. It is different from biological warfare, which is 
also the use of living organisms or their byproducts (toxins) to inflict 
harm, but it has been used by armies for military purposes [2]. Both 
bioterrorism and biological warfare can have devastating effects on 
all kinds of biodiversity, including humans, animals, plants, and other 
life. They can also be directed against resources, for example water 
or food supplies [3] and, in modern applications, against natural and 
manufactured materials [4]. Other expressions, including biocrime 
(biological crime), bioattack (biological attack), biological incidence, 
biothreat (biological threat) and biowar (biological war) have also been 
used to describe bioterrorism or biological warfare.
Bioterrorism or biological warfare is not a new concept because 
history offers several, if not many, examples of the intentional use of 
biological agents or diseased cadavers as weapons for inflicting harm 
upon enemies. We can trace examples back to the 14th century’s siege of 
Kaffa (now in Ukraine) for the earliest recorded biological war, which 
occurred between the Tatars and Kaffa. The Tatar forces catapulted 
plague corpses into the besieged city for spreading this disease. A plague 
outbreak was documented in Kaffa and it has been postulated that the 
fleeing citizens (as well as rats) of Kaffa who escaped via ship to various 
Mediterranean ports aided in the development of the second plague 
pandemic in the mid-1300s [5]. Another example of using disease as 
a biological weapon was the distribution of blankets or handkerchiefs 
used by the British smallpox victims as gifts to the hostile Native 
Americans by British troops in the 18th century [6]. Although there 
was indeed an outbreak of smallpox among these Native American 
tribes, it is difficult to know if these outbreaks were due to the British 
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Abstract
The threat of bioterrorism has attracted a great deal of attention after the nightmare of September 11, 2001 and the 
subsequent days when letters containing anthrax spores attacked the USA. The urgent need for source-tracing of the 
anthrax spores promoted the rapid birth of microbial forensics, which includes the reliable identification of molecular 
variation (biomarkers) between related microbial strains for inferring the origin of a particular isolate. The critical step 
in the development of microbial forensics is to establish a comprehensive database for microbial source tracing. In 
addition, the development of a series of standardized protocols for this new discipline is essential as has been shown 
by the human forensics community. Genetic variations within Yersinia pestis, Bacillus anthracis and Vibrio cholera are 
given as examples for illustrating their use for source tracing. It is certainly easier for scientists within a single country 
to collaborate for establishing a genetic database for a given pathogen, but such a limited regional database will 
restrict the ability to track, or even exclude, international perpetrators. To overcome these limitations, an international 
collaboration mechanism needs to be developed by coordinating scientific, political and regulatory aspects. 
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delivery and release not difficult to accomplish. The availability of 
information and ease of operation makes bioterrorism a method that 
could be quickly applied to many different nefarious purposes.
With advances of biotechnology, it is feared that bacteria and 
viruses could be modified in various ways to turn them into more 
powerful bioweapons [15]. The traditional biological agents, Bacillus 
anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, Brucella spp., etc., can 
be engineered with new features, such as antibiotic resistance, vaccine-
avoidance, decontaminant insensitive, environmentally stable and 
many others. Some have even speculated that advanced biotechnologies 
could be used by bioterrorists for creating engineered agents that target 
specific racial groups, a stealth virus that could incorporate itself into 
the DNA of the target population, and engineered virus with genes that 
control human behaviors and affect whole populations. These advanced 
technologies have been demonstrated through the creation of a novel 
virus by recombinating IL4 gene into mousepox virus [16], and the in 
vitro recreation of the 1918 Spanish flu virus [17] and polio virus [18]. 
Scientists in different fields that are paying attention to bioterrorism 
and biotechnology advances are increasingly worried about the misuse 
of biotechnology[4,15,19-22].
Microbial Forensics
Microorganisms have been used as means to perpetrate criminal 
acts, most recently highlighted by the terrorist attack on the U.S.A. using 
anthrax spore-containing letters in the fall of 2001. There are a number of 
issues for us to answer: such as the first responders’ safety and safety of the 
public, suspected site investigation, sample collection, sample transfer, 
pathogen’s isolation and identification, and the source-tracing of the 
bioagent. Source-tracing of a pathogen is of paramount importance for 
supporting criminal investigations and prosecuting the perpetrator(s) 
[23]. A number of questions needed to be addressed during the anthrax 
attacks about the relationship and the cause of cases in the four states, 
the relationship and origin of the anthrax bacteria isolated in different 
states, and the identity of the domestic or international perpetrator who 
released the pathogen [23]. All these questions can be answered within 
the purview of microbial forensics, which focuses on the individual 
or group who perpetrated the threat. During a bioterrorism criminal 
investigation, microbial forensics will employ traditional investigative 
methodologies, established molecular techniques, and newer advanced 
methods that still may be just under development for the identification 
and source-tracing of the pathogen [23]. As early as 1995, Dr. Randal 
S. Murch suggested that the investigation and solution of bioterrorism 
events would rely heavily on forensic science [24]. The laboratory 
analyses used for microbial forensics may include molecular sequencing, 
microbial cultures, biochemistry, electron microscopy, crystallography, 
and mass spectrometry. These analyses go well beyond those used for 
medical diagnoses and epidemiologic investigations [25]. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the United States 
created the Scientific Working Group on Microbial Genetics and 
Forensics, assembled from leading experts in the relevant fields, U.S. 
government agencies, professional organizations, and nonprofit and 
academic institutions, in order to develop, establish, and validate 
analytical methods, protocols and informatics, standards, training 
and certification programs, quality assurance programs, and research 
priorities for enhancing the capabilities of microbial forensics. The 
National Bioforensics Analysis Center was established recently in the 
United States by the Department of Homeland Security and it will be 
operated in partnership with the FBI for providing a central facility to 
conduct analysis of evidentiary material.
The task for microbial forensics includes sample identification, 
collection, handling and preservation, analytical method selection, 
casework analysis, and result’s interpretation, validation and quality 
assurance. Hence, the new discipline of microbial forensics is a 
conglomeration of an array of well-established fields, such as microbial 
genomics, phylogenetics, forensic information, bioinformatics, 
computer science, and traditional microbiology and epidemiology. 
Microbial forensics will be most effective if there is sufficient basic 
scientific information concerning genetics, evolution, physiology and 
ecology of the biological agents. Molecular techniques have been used 
for years to trace outbreaks of microbial diseases, a practice called 
molecular epidemiology. PulseNet USA was established in 1996 by the 
United States Center for Disease Control for molecular surveillance of 
foodborne infections [26]. It has been successfully used for detection, 
investigation and control of numerous outbreaks caused by Shiga 
toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157:H7, Salmonella enterica, Listeria 
monocytogenes, Shigella spp., and Campylobacter. The PulseNet network 
is now being replicated in different ways in Canada, Europe, the Asia 
Pacific region, and Latin America [27]. These independent networks 
work together in PulseNet International allowing public health officials 
and laboratorians to share molecular epidemiologic information in real-
time and enabling rapid recognition and investigation of multi-national 
foodborne disease outbreaks [27]. It represents a good example on how 
to establish a platform to be used as a primary tool in preparedness 
and response to bioterrorism. The types of genetic markers and 
features that can impact statistical inferences of microbial forensic 
evidence include: single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), repetitive 
sequences, insertions and deletions, mobile elements, pathogenicity 
islands, virulence and resistance genes, housekeeping genes, structural 
genes, whole genome sequences, asexual and sexual reproduction, 
horizontal gene transfer, conjugation, transduction, lysogeny, gene 
conversion, recombination, gene duplication, rearrangements, and 
mutational hotspots [28]. Nucleic acid based typing technologies 
include multilocus sequence typing (MLST) [29], Multilocus variable-
number tandem-repeat analysis (MLVA) [30], clustered regularly 
interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) [31], whole genome 
sequencing [32], and microarrays [33-39]. Some of these techniques 
have been used successfully for tracking B. anthracis used in the “white 
powder letter” biocrimes in 2001 [32] and release of aerosolized B. 
anthracis spores over Kameido, Japan by the Aum Shinrikyo cult [40]. 
Other potential molecular markers used for microbial forensics include 
protein and chemical markers of lipid polysaccharide and sugar etc. 
The stable isotope ratios of a seized pathogen culture could potentially 
reveal information about the environment in which the agent was 
produced [41-45]. It has been employed for predicting the delta(18)O 
and deltaD values of spores produced in nutritionally identical media 
and local water sources for five different locations around the United 
States [44]. No matter which techniques are used, a basic reference 
database for these markers is of paramount importance. Next, we will 
show the development of a genetic polymorphism database for Yersinia 
pestis and an example of tracking B. anthracis used in the 2001 anthrax-
letter biocrime in the United States by different techniques.
Genetic Polymorphism Database for Source-Tracing of 
Bioterrorism-Associated Agents
As mentioned above, different techniques can be employed for 
establishing basic reference databases for microbial forensics analysis. 
Genetic, protein and chemical markers have been investigated for 
Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of bubonic and pneumonic plagues. 
It is thought to be one of the most dangerous bacterial pathogens in 
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the world. Credible estimates of the number of people killed by this 
bacterium during the course of history approach 200 million. Plague is 
maintained in natural disease foci in wild rodents through transmission 
between rodents by their flea ectoparasites. The striking lethality is 
a consequence of vector-borne transmission peculiarities for this 
pathogen in nature as infected fleas have to leave their dead hosts in the 
search of a blood meal and, thus, carry the infection to a new victim, 
new host. Y. pseudotuberculosis is believed to be the ancestor of Y. pestis 
[46-48]. Their evolutionary divergence occurred 2,600-28,000 years ago 
[46]. This speciation and further intraspecific modifications resulted in 
the wide spectrum of Y. pestis intraspecies groups (biovars, subspecies, 
ecotypes, plasmidovars, genotypes, etc.) differing in their host range 
and lethality. Currently, the microevolution of Y. pestis accommodates 
the adaptation of this pathogen to more than 200 species of wild 
rodents inhabiting natural plague foci on all of the continents except 
for Australia and Antarctica. Plague transmission is mediated by at least 
80 different species of fleas. Studying Y. pestis microevolution may help 
solve basic medical microbiological questions such as the origin and 
evolution of animal and human infectious diseases, as well as, improve 
the methods of microbial forensics, agent identification, geno- and 
genomotyping of Y. pestis.
In the past few years, and owing in part to the availability of whole 
genome sequence data from many bacterial species including different 
strains from the same species, a high number of polymorphism 
sources, and consequently typing methods, have emerged. For Yersinia 
pestis these include: MLST [49], SNPs [50], MLVA [51,52], different 
region (DFR) typing [53] and analysis [31]. These new methods 
(SNPs, MLVA, DFR and CRISPRs) are likely to replace the previous 
pattern-comparison methods (such as insertion sequence (IS) typing 
by southern blotting, ribotyping or pulsed-field gel electrophoresis) 
which are more expensive and not fully appropriate to the creation of 
international databases [54-58]. As sequencing technologies advance, 
bacterial whole genome sequence analysis is becoming relatively 
easy for even conventional laboratories [59,60]. Using genome-wide 
variations of a pathogen for source tracing analysis will become popular 
because it will give us a comprehensive view of genetic variation from a 
specific pathogen and, hence, relatively definitive conclusions.
SNPs
Due to the close evolutionary relationship between Y. pestis and 
Y. pseudotuberculosis, they cannot be differentiated by MLST [49]. 
However, 76 conservative sSNPs within 3,250 orthologous CDSs 
(coding sequences) were revealed by comparative analysis of three whole 
genomes of Y. pestis, representing different biovars of this pathogen 
[50]. A three-branched phylogenetic tree was inferred by using SNP 
variations and a novel genetic typing scheme was proposed. By using 
whole genome sequence analysis, more SNPs have been uncovered 
for genetic typing, which is more discriminating [46]. By using SNP 
information, the etiology for the Black Death was successfully traced, 
confirming multiple importation events of the plague to Europe and 
that the ancient agent was the ancestor of modern Y. pestis biovars 
Orientalis and Medievalis [61]. By using whole genome sequencing and 
SNP information, Y. pestis from a specific region could be differentiated 
[62,63]. In our laboratory we have sequenced more than 100 strains 
of Y. pestis from different natural plague foci in China and more than 
2000 new SNPs were found and used to create a very finely resolved 
phylogenetic tree (data not published), which will help us to design a 
more discriminative genotyping method to distinguish Y. pestis isolates.
MLVA
The genomic polymorphism associated with tandem repeats 
has been instrumental in mammalian genetics for the con¬struction 
of genetic maps and still is the basis of DNA fin¬gerprinting in 
forensic applications [64,65]. Tandem repeats are usually classified as 
satellites sequences (spanning megabases of DNA and associated with 
heterochromatin), minisatel¬lites (repeat units in the range 6-100 bp 
and spanning hun¬dreds of basepairs) or microsatellites (repeat units 
in the range 1-5 bp and spanning a few tens of nucleotides). 
Recent studies show that tandem repeat polymorphisms of mini 
and mi¬crosatellites are likely to be a highly significant source of very 
informative markers for the identification of patho¬genic bacteria, even 
for recently emerged, highly monomorphic species [66-73]. Tandem 
repeats prob¬ably contribute to a pathogen’s adaptation to its host, and 
they also account for bacterial phenotypic var¬iations depending on 
their genomic location. For example, if a tandem repeat is lo¬cated 
within the regulatory region of a gene it can play an on/off switching 
role in gene expression at the transcriptional level [74]. Similarly, if 
they are located within coding regions with a repeat unit length of 
three bases they may cause antigen variation for that bacterium; but 
if the repeat unit length is not a mul¬tiple of three, they can induce a 
truncated translation product. 
VNTR sequences are common in the Y. pestis genome and occur 
frequently in gene coding regions. They are present at an average of 
2.18 arrays per 10 kbp and are distributed evenly throughout the 
genome and the two virulence plasmids, pCD1 and pMT1 [75]. 
Tandem-repeat typing may prove to be a powerful complement to 
the existing phylogenetic tools for Y. pestis. Adair et al. [76] identified 
a tetranucleotide repeat sequence, (CAAA)N, in the genome of 
Yersinia pestis, and demonstrated that this region has nine alleles and 
great diversity (calculated as 1 minus the sum of the squared allele 
frequencies) (diversity value = 0.82) within a set of 35 diverse  
strains. 
Multiple-locus VNTR analysis (MLVA) has proved to be capable of 
both distinguishing closely related strains and successfully classifying 
more distant relationships. Pourcel et al. [52] and Klevytska et al. [75] 
examined representative strains of Y. pestis by using 25 and 42 VNTR 
loci, respectively, and vast differences in diversity were observed among 
these loci. Pourcel et al. [52] grouped 180 Y. pestis into 61 different 
genotypes with the three biovars distributed correctly into the three 
main branches. They showed the heterogeneity of biovar Medievalis 
and proposed that 7 selected VNTR markers would be sufficient for 
quick characterization of a new strain. Compared to other genotyping 
methods, MLVA is easily standardized for establishing databases. The 
fact that Y. pestis is one of the most dangerous bioterrorism agents 
prevents the international exchange of bacterial strains and limits 
collaborative research; which creates a barrier for better understanding 
plague ecology and global evolution. Web-based comparison and 
identification of VNTR genotypes of Y. pestis capitalizes upon 
standardized typing systems and minimizes the impact of international 
transfer barriers.
Le Flèche et al. [74] created a database (http://minisatellites.u-
psud.fr) of tandem repeats for pathogenic bacteria based on publicly 
available bacterial genomes. Its wide applicability was illustrated by 
the characterization of minisatellites from two important human 
pathogens, Y. pestis and Bacillus anthracis. They found that Y .pestis 
contains 64 minisatellites with repeat units at least 9 bp long where the 
unit is repeated at least 7 times.
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but are copied from existing DNA sequences [31]. The vast majority 
of known spacers lack any similarity to currently available sequences. 
However, when similarities exist, they most often correspond to short 
portions of mobile elements such as phages. These observations have 
led to the suggestion that CRISPRs were a defense-mechanism against 
genetic invasions [31]. Simple evolution rules have been proposed for 
CRISPRs which open the way to phylogenetic investigations: (1) new 
spacers are acquired in a polarized way from one extremity adjacent 
to the leader sequence which acts as a transcription promoter; (2) 
losses may occur randomly along the array; (3) the probability of 
acquisition of the same spacers independently is extremely low. 
The analysis of CRISPRs have already played an important role 
in investigating the epidemiology of the major human pathogen, 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (the corresponding typing method is called 
“spoligotyping”). A database containing the typing information from 
thirty thousand isolates has been built [82]. Although this represents 
only a very small fraction of TB isolates worldwide, the database is by far 
the largest existing typing database for a bacterial pathogen. One reason 
is that the method is sufficiently robust and easy to run at a reasonable 
cost, such that many laboratories could produce the data and easily 
share it. Secondly, the resulting data is useful for phylogenetic analysis 
and has enabled definition of large strain families. A third reason was 
the relatively simple status of the M. tuberculosis CRISPR locus. The 
locus is apparently inactive; it does not acquire new spacers, so that a 
fixed and limited set of relevant spacers could be defined to produce 
“spoligotyping membranes”. The availability of a similar approach for 
Y. pestis would be of use for at least two reasons. First, it would allow 
for the large-scale screening of Yersinia pseudotuberculosis strains to 
identify Y. pestis’s closest neighbors, as well as providing a systematic 
and routine typing approach for current Y. pestis collections and new 
isolates. Secondly, CRISPRs represent a potentially very interesting 
tool for the investigation of ancient DNA (aDNA). The nature of the 
early plague pandemics is still controversial, and one reason for this 
may be the lack of appropriate genetic targets for Y. pestis aDNA 
investigation. Y. pestis CRISPR loci are still active31 and able to acquire 
new spacers (in contrast with the M. tuberculosis CRISPRs). Therefore, 
it is necessary to list the repertoire of existing CRISPR spacers. If this 
repertoire eventually turns out to be very large, as in some bacteria, 
then the development of such an assay will necessitate the use of DNA 
chips, which are able to deal with a larger number of spacers compared 
to the current spoligotyping assay format. The first repertoire of 
CRISPR spacers was deduced from Y. pestis isolates that only represent 
a small part of the global and historical genetic diversity for Y. pestis 
[31]. Less than 40 spacers were identified, in the three Y. pestis CRISPR 
loci, suggesting that perhaps the repertoire within a larger collection 
might remain tractable. 
Whole genome sequencing analysis
Whole genome sequencing has been widely used for Y. pestis and 
used for tracing the source of a laboratory acquired plague [83]. With 
whole genome sequences, we can identify different kinds of genetic 
variations, including SNPs, gene rearrangement, gene loss and gain, 
VNTRs and CRISPRs for a comprehensive understanding of bacterial 
genome diversity and for a fine source-tracing analysis. When these 
genome-wide variations are used for typing purpose, it is refered to 
WGST (Whole Genome Sequence Typing). With the rapid advances 
of next generation sequencing technologies, we can obtain genome 
sequences from tens or hundreds of bacterial strains in a single species, 
providing us an opportunity to build a database of genome diversity for 
source-tracing analysis. As shown above, the different genetic variation 
Denoeud et al. [77] then presented an Internet-based resource to 
help develop and perform tandem repeats based bacterial strain typing. 
These tools are also accessible through the above Web link. There are 
four parts to the web page: 1) The “Tandem Repeats Database” enables 
the identification of tandem repeats across entire genomes. 2) The 
“Strain Comparison Page” identifies tandem repeats differing between 
different genome sequences from the same species. 3) The “Blast in 
the Tandem Repeats Database” facilitates the search for a known 
tandem repeat and the prediction of PCR product sizes using primers 
containing the tandem repeat. 4) The “Bacterial Genotyping Page” is a 
service for strain identification at the subspecies level. 
MLVA has been used by American scientists to establish a database 
for more than 1000 Y. pestis strains [78]. The 43 markers used are 
relatively shorter VNTRs while the Europe scientists employed relatively 
longer repeats for database establishment [52]. We also employed these 
markers for successfully tracing the source of a primary pneumonic 
plague outbreak in 2009 [79]. If an internationally accepted database is 
developed, the method employed needs to be standardized. 
DFR
Bacteria can adapt themselves to a new niche by gene loss and/
or acquisition. These events can be analyzed by using whole genome 
sequencing or subtractive hybridization, but they are too expensive and 
laborious to be applied to a large number of bacterial strains. Whole 
genome-based DNA microarray is an ideal technique for analyzing 
genomic fragment differences among large numbers of bacterial strains. 
Zhou et al. employed a whole genome DNA microarray, comprising 4005 
ORFs (genes) from Y. pestis 91001 and CO92, to screen the differences 
between 43 strains of Y. pestis and 7 strains of Y. pseudotuberculosis [53]. 
They found twenty-two DFRs among these strains. Next, one or more 
genes were chosen from each DFR to represent the genomic difference. 
PCR amplification of the selected genes was performed on more than 
900 isolates of Y. pestis, isolated from different natural plague foci and 
different years, to screen for the distribution of DFRs in these strains. 
The DFR profiles of these isolates could be assigned into fourteen 
genomovar. The DFRs represent the dynamic regions of the Y. pestis 
genome in natural populations; suggesting their features of acquisition 
or deletion have a role in the adaptive evolution of Y. pestis. The parallel 
microevolution of the Y. pestis genome in natural populations was 
examined and revealed evidence of genome content flux through the 
loss/acquisition of plasmids and chromosomal segments.
The microevolution of the genomovars is perfectly consistent 
with the expansion of plague foci [53,80]. Each of the genomovars is 
confined to a specific geographic region, namely a plague focus or part 
of a focus with a unique set of environments, reservoirs and vectors. 
Most of the geographic regions with different primary reservoirs have 
their own unique genomovars [80]. Sometimes, there is more than one 
genomovar in a single focus and within a single primary reservoir, but 
each of the genomovars corresponds to a unique natural environment 
and primary vector(s). Therefore, DFR could be used to roughly 
locate the origin of an unknown Y. pestis, but more discriminative 
differentiation of its strains needs the help of other molecular methods 
such as MLVA or SNPs [81].
CRISPRs
CRISPRs are well-defined structures and present in many bacteria 
and in most archaea, sometimes in multiple copies per genome. The 
CRISPR structure itself is usually surrounded by CRISPR-associated 
genes (cas genes). New spacer sequences are not synthesized de novo, 
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types can be input into databases and then coupled to source-tracing 
software, rendering a rapid and accurate tracking of the target pathogen.
Other methods
Other methods, including fatty acids analysis and bacterial mass 
fingerprinting (BMF), are potentially useful for strain discrimination. 
Song et al. evaluated the possibility of utilizing Cellular Fatty Acids (CFA) 
information for typing Y. pestis [84]. They used 58 strains representing 
different ecotypes isolated in different regions of China. Major CFAs 
of the tested strains are 16:0, cyclo 17:0, 3OH-14:0, ω7c 16:1 and 
monounsaturated 18 carbon acids, which account for more than 70% 
of the total CFAs. Dendrogram construction of the tested strains reveals 
a great homogeneity among these Y. pestis isolates, which suggests that 
CFA analysis cannot serve as a powerful typing tool for Y. pestis strain 
differentiation. All the experimental Y. pestis strains were mis-identified 
as Y. pseudotuberculosis by the Sherlock system. Later, Tan et al. found 
that these two pathogens could be differentiated by using ratios of 
certain CFA components as chemical markers [85]. Additionally, Liu et 
al. developed a universal sample preparation method for BMFanalysis 
and has demonstrated the discriminatory power of BMF [86]. BMF was 
obtained by MALDI-TOF MS and it has been shown to be potential 
for inexpensive and rapid typing of MRSA in infection control [87,88]. 
MALDI-TOF MS was also successfully employed to identify Legionella 
spp. with easy operation and high efficiency [89].
Tracking of Bacillus Anthracis used in Biocrime of 2001 
in the United States
After it was determined that the anthrax cases following September 
11 were bioterrorist attacks, the FBI used every investigative technique 
available to investigate the criminal perpetrator(s). The FBI employed 
all possible strategies including: round-the-clock surveillances, 
eavesdropping, searches and hundreds of polygraphs. Altogether, 
agents conducted 5,000 interviews and served more than 1,700 grand 
jury subpoenas, which involved 40 of the FBI’s 56 field offices, as well 
as many of its 44 overseas legal attaches. The Bureau established 112 
separate databases to store information about the case, and even offered 
a reward of $2.5 million for information leading to a conviction. In the 
end, it was the scientific evidence, including genome sequencing, VNTR 
analysis and analysis of the extrasporular material in the envelopes, 
that provided the final results that the B. anthracis attack strain was the 
Ames strain and “homemade in USA” [90]. Comparison of the whole-
genome sequence of Bacillus anthracis isolated from a victim of the 
bioterrorist anthrax attack with a reference revealed 60 new markers 
that included single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), inserted 
or deleted sequences, and tandem repeats [32]. Further molecular 
subtyping of Bacillus anthracis strains during the 2001 bioterrorism-
associated outbreak demonstrated that all isolates were MLVA genotype 
62, the same as the Ames strain used in laboratories [13]. Sequence 
analysis of the protective antigen gene (pagA) from 42 representative 
outbreak isolates determined that they all had a pagA sequence 
indistinguishable from the Ames strain (PA genotype I) [13]. Recently, 
a systematic microbiological analysis of the spores from 2001 letters 
revealed morphological mutants that are not commonly seen in the 
environment. The morphological mutant analysis was a novel approach 
for forensics that combined systematic microbiological analysis with 
whole-genome sequencing and comparative genomics [91].
Source-Tracing of Vibrio Cholera Outbreak in Haiti 
after Earthquake In 2010
On January 12, 2010 there was a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in 
the capital of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, and surrounding areas. Some 10 
months later there was a devastating outbreak of cholera [92]. Its origin 
could not be confirmed, but origin of the disease was rumored to be a 
battalion of Nepalese soldiers serving as United Nations peacekeepers 
[93,94]. Though the use of WGST, the Haiti outbreak strains were 
confirmed to be closely linked to Nepalese strains, with only one or two 
base-pair differences, providing sound evidence that the Haiti outbreak 
of cholera was caused by a Vibrio cholera strain from Nepal [95]. The 
importance of this source-tracing analysis is that it shows the rapid 
global transmission of infectious disease and the power of molecular 
biological techniques in tracking the agent of infectious disease. This 
work also strengthens the need for a genetic diversity database based on 
whole genome sequencing analysis and argues for the sharing of data 
for all known pathogens though international collaboration. It is only 
through international data sharing and databases that source-tracing of 
pathogens will be truly effective.
Database-Building and Perspectives
The new discipline of microbial forensics represents a powerful 
approach for tracking pathogens associated with bioterrorism or natural 
disease’s outbreaks. As mentioned above, the key factor for successful 
development of microbial forensics is database-building for different 
biomarkers and all available global strains. Given that the transfer of 
bioterrorism-associated pathogens and their byproducts, even DNAs 
is frequently restricted or even prohibited by law, it makes database-
building for international sharing extremely difficult. In other words, 
development of such a database is not only a technical challenge for the 
scientific community, but also a political challenge for the international 
community. How we use our wisdom to bridge this gap is paramount 
for the successful development of international microbial forensics. 
A country-limited database will not be as useful for the investigation 
of international bioterrorism and international spread of infectious 
diseases as a global joint effort. Communication between scientists 
and politicians from different nations, and collaborations between 
scientists from different countries, will be essential for developing 
internationally accepted techniques for standardized biomarkers and 
also critical for establishment of such a database. For example, there 
are two well-developed MLVA techniques for Y. pestis, but scientists 
from the U.S.A. employed smaller repeats markers [78], and those 
from Europe larger ones [52], making these data mostly incompatible. 
Without the collaboration of scientists from Russia and China, where 
the most diversified strains of Y. pestis are distributed [48,96,97], the 
MLVA databases of Y. pestis will not be comprehensive. Therefore, an 
authoritative database should be built based on the consensus reached 
by scientists in the field. WGST [95] is now the most applicable 
technique for such database-building and finely selected MLVA loci 
could be the second technique of choice because it is relatively easy 
to standardize [40,79]. Although PFGE has been successfully used for 
tracing the source of food-borne pathogens, its discriminative power 
is relatively low and its operation is tedious, rendering this technique 
unsuitable for forensic database-building. However, the experiences 
with this technique for database-building should be taken as an example 
for microbial forensics [26,98-101]. Other kinds of methods, including 
MLST, DFR and CRISPR analysis, could also be used for a specific case 
investigation.
In conclusion, development of microbial forensics is critical to 
the pursuit of biocriminals, and international collaborations and 
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